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Foreign exchange intervention and  
foreign exchange market development in Korea 
Gwang-Ju Rhee and Eun Mo Lee 
1.  Foreign exchange market intervention in Korea 
1.1  Foreign exchange system 
Over two or three decades, the Korean exchange rate system has been shifted from a fixed to a 
flexible one. From March 1990, Korea adopted a market average exchange rate system, a form of 
managed floating exchange rate system. Under this system, the daily exchange rate movements were 
limited within certain bands.
1 After the currency crisis, Korea changed to a floating exchange rate 
system in December 1997. In principle, the exchange rate in this system is supposed to be determined 
by the interaction of foreign exchange supply and demand in the foreign exchange market. Along with 
this change in the exchange rate system, inflation targeting was chosen as Korea’s monetary policy 
framework. 
The objectives of exchange rate operations have changed as the exchange rate system has. Under 
the managed floating system, the objectives mostly lay in achieving current account equilibrium or 
maintaining real effective exchange rate stabilisation. Since the adoption of the floating exchange rate 
system, however, major emphasis is now laid on attaining foreign exchange market stabilisation 
through alleviating excessive short-term exchange rate volatility. This is partly because under an 
inflation targeting system achieving the inflation rate target and exchange rate target simultaneously is 
very difficult. Furthermore, the exchange rate now serves as an information, rather than a policy 
variable. 
There are two administrative bodies involved in Korean exchange rate operations: the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Bank of Korea (BOK). According to the Foreign Exchange 
Transaction Act (FETA) and the Bank of Korea Act, the MOFE and the BOK are to serve in 
partnership as the exchange rate administrative body. The FETA states that the Minister of the MOFE 
has overall responsibility for foreign exchange policy, including exchange rate operations. The Bank of 
Korea Act stipulates that the BOK also formulates foreign exchange policy, in cooperation with the 
MOFE. That is, the BOK is authorised to supervise the money changers and foreign exchange 
brokers, as well as to oversee foreign exchange transactions, and it endeavours to develop the foreign 
exchange market as a member of the Seoul foreign exchange market committee.
2 
The MOFE established the foreign exchange stabilisation fund in March 1967 and has managed it for 
the purpose of achieving foreign exchange market stability. As legal administrator of the foreign 
exchange stabilisation fund, the Minister of the MOFE makes overall decisions concerning the means 
of funding and the operation of the fund.
3 However, the actual operation details and ordinary 
management of the fund are delegated to the Governor of the BOK. The Bank of Korea, as the central 
bank, holds and manages the nation′s international reserves, composed of the foreign exchange 
stabilisation fund and the BOK′s own reserves, and is also in charge of implementing foreign 
exchange market intervention operations in consultation with the MOFE.  
                                                       
1   The daily bands were initially set at ±0.4% from the average rate of the previous day. They were widened gradually as 
follows: ±0.6% (Sep 1991) → ±0.8% (Jul 1992) → ±1.0% (Oct 1993) → ±1.5% (Nov 1994) → ±2.25% (Dec 1995) → ±10.0% 
(20Nov 1997). 
2   The Seoul foreign exchange market committee was initially established in 1989 as a self-regulating body for consultation 
among market participants. It established the Seoul code of conduct in December 2001 to promote efficient market 
practices, to ensure fair competition and relationships between market participants, and to minimise disputes between 
counterparties. 
3   Issuance of foreign fxchange stabilisation bonds is used as a main instrument for funding. BIS Papers No 24  197
 
1.2  Foreign exchange market intervention 
Foreign exchange market intervention has been used as a main instrument in achieving foreign 
exchange market stabilisation in Korea. As is also the case in other countries with floating exchange 
rate systems, the objective of foreign exchange intervention in Korea is to (i) mitigate short-term 
exchange rate volatility, (ii) stabilise the foreign exchange market, (iii) pre-empt speculative attacks, 
and iv) acquire foreign reserves, rather than to maintain a certain exchange rate target. In fact, it is 
true that with its thin foreign exchange market Korea faces the possibility of severe exchange rate 
volatility caused by various external shocks, due to changes in the global economic environment and 
even geopolitical risks surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the Korean foreign exchange 
authorities have also played the role of market maker through intervention by supplying sufficient 
liquidity in the market and filling the gaps between bids and offers in the market. After the currency 
crisis in 1997, intervention was, unusually, utilised to increase international reserves in order to 
enhance Korea′s credit rating and avoid the possibility of additional crisis.  
As for the intervention tools, verbal intervention by the authorities (MOFE and BOK) and real 
intervention in the spot market are typically used. Verbal intervention is used to facilitate foreign 
exchange market stability beforehand or to give speculative forces a warning by conveying the 
authorities’ concerns and intention related to exchange rate movements. However, intervention in the 
forward market has been employed as rarely as possible, except during the currency crisis period and 
in the second half of last year, when there was severe speculative trading in the off-shore 
non-deliverable forwards (NDF) market. In fact, intervention in the NDF market should be done 
cautiously: intervention operations could become all too frequent since the settlement for intervention 
is not needed immediately, and the effect of intervention on the exchange rate at maturity would then 
be the opposite of what was initially intended.  
The decision of when and how much to intervene in the market depends on the authorities’ 
discretionary judgment, rather than on any implicit rule. Many elements, such as the strength and 
nature of the external shock, the movements of market indices, market sentiments and the volume of 
funds available, are all taken into account in making the discretionary decision. To that end, the BOK 
monitors exchange rate developments and the foreign exchange market situation on a real-time basis, 
through incessant contacts with dealers and analysis of various reports from the banks.
4 
In determining the best timing for intervention, the authorities consider the degree of exchange rate 
misalignment and the permanency of the market distortion. Exchange rate misalignment should not, 
however, be a strict yardstick for deciding when to intervene at least in the short time horizon, since 
each method of calculating the equilibrium exchange rate has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Furthermore, under the free floating exchange rate system the exchange rate produced by foreign 
exchange market forces could be regarded as an equilibrium exchange rate in a market behavioural 
sense. Meanwhile, the magnitude of intervention depends on market participants′ order flows, the risk 
premium and market expectations. The BOK recognises that the effects of identical intervention 
amounts may differ depending on market participants′ expectations. 
To gauge the scope of foreign exchange market instability, the following market indices are employed: 
(i) the pace of exchange rate change, (ii) the magnitude of exchange rate volatility, iii) the bid-offer 
spread, (iv) the transaction volume. However, even if foreign exchange market instability does appear, 
other factors are also broadly considered before intervention is executed, including the source of 
economic disturbances, the duration of the shock, compatibility of intervention with the current 
macroeconomic policy, and the availability of intervention resources.  
The Bank of Korea intervenes in the market through agents selected among major banks. In doing 
this, the BOK imposes a confidentiality requirement on these agent banks, to maintain secrecy 
concerning intervention. As for the criteria used to select the agent banks, priority is given to 
institutions with the following characteristics: no danger of default risk, ability to provide the BOK with 
instant market information, and active roles as market makers. Even though these agents trade in the 
market to meet the intervention goals, the decision-making procedure is, of course, carried out by the 
BOK, in consultation with the MOFE. 
                                                       
4   Since April 1999, the Bank of Korea has managed and operated a foreign exchange information system to closely monitor 
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Like other countries, Korea sterilises changes in its domestic money supply brought about by foreign 
exchange market intervention. The major sterilisation instrument for the BOK is issuance or withdrawal 
of monetary stabilisation bonds (MSBs).
5 In some instances, the government has shared the burden of 
managing the money aggregates by using the foreign exchange stabilisation fund’after intervention by 
the BOK. In the case of the MOFE′s intervention in the market using the foreign exchange stabilisation 
fund, sterilisation by BOK issuance of MSBs is not necessarily required since the money supply does 
not change.
6  
Despite the absence of any effect of money supply changes on the exchange rate, sterilised 
intervention is known to be effective in the short run through the signalling channel, the portfolio 
balance channel and the noise trading channel. Among these, the signalling channel is believed to be 
most effective in Korea, since the credibility of the central bank, a key element in intervention 
effectiveness, is considered to be good. In addition, the liquidity effect in the foreign exchange market 
seems to be significant because of the large scale of intervention relative to market turnover in Korea’s 
thin foreign exchange market.  
In principle, the Korean authorities have maintained secrecy regarding foreign exchange intervention. 
While it necessitates a loss of transparency in exchange rate operations, the secrecy principle aims to 
achieve the positive effects of avoiding superfluous controversy over the validity of intervention, 
inducing autonomous exchange rate adjustments through market participants’ trading, and preventing 
speculative forces from benefiting from the relevant information. Another consideration is the fact that 
most countries, with the exception of some developed countries, do not disclose the details of their 
interventions.  
2.  Recent exchange rate and foreign exchange market development 
2.1  Exchange rate operation since adoption of free floating system 
Since Korea′s adoption of the free floating exchange rate system in December 1997, evaluation of its 
exchange rate operations has shown that on the whole application of market mechanisms to 
exchange rate determination has been enhanced in comparison to previous periods. On the other 
hand, some economists have expressed negative views on the policy perspective behind exchange 
rate operations, arguing that the authorities still have a fear of floating for sharp exchange rate 
fluctuations. As rationale for this argument, they point to (i) the increase in international reserves due 
to foreign exchange intervention, (ii) the limited extent of exchange rate volatility, (iii) suspicions that 
the Korean authorities target a certain level of exchange rate for assuring export price 
competitiveness. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, it is clear that the authorities in Korea have maintained the principle 
that the exchange rate should be determined in the market by interaction of the demand for and 
supply of foreign exchange. Foreign exchange market intervention is implemented not to target a 
certain level but to smooth radical changes in the exchange rate when there is a transient external 
shock or a bid-offer gap due to one-sided exchange rate expectations. 
As for the first rationale behind the pessimistic views, it is true that the international reserves of Korea 
have been increased rapidly, from US$ 48.5 billion at the end of 1998 to US$ 199.1 billion at the end 
of 2004. Nonetheless, in addition to the foreign exchange market intervention, this increase is also 
largely attributable to the issuance of Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Bonds (US dollar-denominated) 
by the Korean government, the withdrawal of foreign exchange deposits from commercial banks, and 
the interest earnings accrued from international reserve management. 
                                                       
5   MSBs are issued and circulated based on the Bank of Korea Act and the Monetary Stabilisation Bond Act, to control the 
monetary aggregates. 
6   FESF is financed by issuing foreign fxchange stabilization bonds for the purpose of foreign exchange market stabilisation. 
MOFE needs permission from the Congress in the process of issuing the bonds because it affects the fiscal balance of the 
government. BIS Papers No 24  199
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With regard to the second claim, the fact of the matter is that won/dollar exchange rate volatility has 
increased significantly since adoption of the free floating system. That is, the daily ex post volatilities 
measured by the differences between each day’s and each previous day’s closing rates and between 
the daily highs and lows have both more than doubled compared to the period before introduction of 
the free floating system. 
 


















Apr - Dec  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Day-on-day 
percentage change
4  0.16 0.36 0.70  0.29  0.28 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.30 
Daily percentage 
change
5  0.26 0.59 1.22  0.57  0.46 0.52 0.50 0.45 0.40 
1  3.1.1995 - 31.10.1997.  
2  1.4.1998 - 30.9.2004.  
3  Excluding the currency crisis period (1.11.1997-31.3.1998). 
4  Averaged 
absolute value of (each day's closing rate - previous day's closing rate)/previous day's closing rate.   
5  Average of (daily high 
- daily low)/each day′s average rate. 
 
Thirdly, the assertion that the Korean authorities have actively intervened in the market to target an 
exchange rate sustainable for maintaining price competitiveness is not unambiguous. The nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) indexes show that since 1998 changes in yearly averages have been 
widening to 5.3%, from 2.0% during the periods before the currency crisis. In 2003 and 2004, the 
figures represent a stable pattern, implying that the Korean won has kept pace with the movements of 
other currencies. Similarly, the yearly changes in the real effective exchange rate (REER) indexes 
have also increased since adoption of the free floating system, while the won has appreciated a bit 
compared to other currencies since 2002. These figures may imply that the won has not been 
operated for the purpose of targeting a specific exchange rate level, but that its value has instead 
been determined in the market, reflecting the global trends of major currencies. 200  BIS Papers No 24
 
























N E E R  2.04  0.8  0.2  –4.9  5.34  –18.5 2.6  6.6 –5.9 2.8 –0.3 0.3 
R E E R
5 2.34  1.0  1.6  –4.3 5.24 –17.0  2.8  7.6  –3.5 3.4  0.9 1.4 
1  Jan 1995 - Oct 1997.   
2  Apr 1998 - Aug 2004.   
3  Excluding  the  currency  crisis  period  (Nov 1997 - Mar 1998).   
4  Figures 
represent the averages of the absolute values of the yearly appreciation(+) or depreciation(–) ratios.   
5  CPI-weighted. 
 
2.2  Foreign exchange transaction trends 
The daily average turnover of total foreign exchange transactions in the inter-bank and customer 
markets amounted to US$ 20.4 billion in the second quarter of 2004, more than double the figure of 
US$ 9.2 billion in 2001. The proportion of spot transactions has declined from 58 % to 47 %, while 
those of forwards, foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange derivatives have increased. 
 
Foreign exchange turnover 
(Daily average) 
(US$ 100 m) 
2004 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1/4 2/4 
Spots  43.3 54.9 53.2 50.7 56.1 79.3 96.1 
Forwards  6.0 10.4 11.3 12.5 20.7 30.4 31.2 
FX  swaps  16.5 18.3 19.5 19.6 30.1 48.6 53.8 
Traditional 
FX transactions (A)  65.8 83.5 84.0 82.8 106.9 158.3 181.1 
Currency derivatives  1.2  3.3 4.9 6.4  10.2 13.2 14.6 
Interest rate 
derivatives  1.9 1.8 2.9 2.8 4.7 5.4 8.1 
FX derivatives (B)
1  3.0 5.1 7.8 9.1 14.9 18.6 22.7 
Total (A + B)  68.8  88.6 91.8 91.9  121.8 176.9 203.8 
1  Equity and credit-related derivatives excluded. 
 


























This indicates that the Korean foreign exchange market has been developed in terms not only of its 
quantity, but also of its quality.
7 Furthermore, this is mainly attributable to the increase in economic 
entities’ transactions for the purpose of hedging under influence of the authorities’ efforts to heighten 
market functioning of the exchange rate since adoption of the free floating system.  
2.3  Determinants of the won/dollar exchange rate 
The movement of the won exchange rate against the US dollar is basically influenced by foreign 
exchange flows including the current account balance, which has shown a surplus since 1998, and 
foreign portfolio investment in the Korean equity and bond markets. Recently, however, it has been 
greatly affected by external factors such as the movement of the Japanese yen due to the global trend 
of the US dollar, and off-shore NDF transactions by non-residents. 
The recent movements of the won/dollar exchange rate have shown a pattern of synchronisation with 
the fluctuations of the yen against the dollar. This is mainly due to strong market participants’ 
expectations that the won will trace the yen, in light of the intense export competition between Korea 
and Japan. Looking at the correlation coefficients between the two exchange rates, the co-movement 
turned out to be particularly noticeable in 2002 and in 2004. 
 
Correlation coefficient between won and yen exchange rate 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
0.20 0.35 0.77 0.39 0.80 
Note:  Period average of monthly figures which are calculated using daily data. 
 
 
                                                       
7   The ratio of the total daily turnover to nominal GDP has increased from 1.2% in 1998 to 3.3% in 2004, while the ratio of the 
daily turnover to trade has changed from 1.8% in 1998 to 5.4% in 2004. 202  BIS Papers No 24
 

























Considering the intense export competition between the two countries, the won′s exchange rate 
against the Japanese yen is obviously important. In this regard, before the currency crisis period the 
strengthening of the US dollar (and consequent weakening of the yen) caused an accompanying 
appreciation of the won and thus impaired Korea’s export competitiveness. In contrast, the recent 
synchronised pattern of the won and yen exchange rate has mitigated the loss of Korean export 
competitiveness since the strong dollar results in weakening of the yen and won simultaneously (see 
Annex 1). 
In tandem with the movements of the yen, off-shore NDF transactions are also crucial in determining 
the won/dollar exchange rate. NDF transactions between Korean foreign exchange banks and 
non-residents have been sharply increasing since they were first allowed in April 1999 as a part of 
foreign exchange liberalisation in Korea. For example, the daily turnover of NDF transactions between 
Korean foreign exchange banks and non-residents for the purpose of hedging and speculative 
demand has increased from US$ 0.4 billion in 2000 to US$ 1.5 billion in the third quarter of 2004. 
 
Daily turnover of NDF transactions 
(US$ 100 m) 
2004
P 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
1/4 2/4 3/4 
4.0 5.1 6.7  13.4 14.4 17.6 15.3 
 
While NDF transactions between Korean foreign exchange banks and non-residents offer a 
convenient hedging tool, they also provide a chance to trade for speculative purposes and act as one 
of the significant determinants of the won/dollar exchange rate. For instance, non-residents’ buying of 
dollars in the won/dollar NDF market results in the foreign exchange positions of their counterparty 
foreign exchange banks being short. The banks then usually take long positions in the spot market to 
square their exchange risk exposures, causing the won to be depreciated (see Annex 2). Meanwhile, 
an increase in NDF trading seems to be attributable to the co-movement of the won and yen exchange 
rates since non-residents normally take changes in the yen/dollar exchange rate as a reference in 
trading won/dollar NDF. That is, when the yen depreciates against the US dollar, non-residents buy BIS Papers No 24  203
 
won/dollar NDFs and cause the won to depreciate. In contrast, when the yen appreciates against 
dollar, non-residents sell off won/dollar NDFs, bringing about the won appreciation. 
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2.4  Regulation on NDF transactions 
Under the growing impact of NDFs on the won/dollar exchange rate, non-residents’ speculative NDF 
transactions have been prevalent since late 2003, bringing about a greater possibility of foreign 
exchange market turbulence. To cope with this, the Korean government implemented regulations on 
Korean foreign exchange banks’ NDF transactions with non-residents in January 2004.  
The regulations applied both to banks’ overbought and oversold positions. That is, banks’ NDF 
overbought positions resulting from trading with non-residents were required to be 110% or less of 
their NDF overbought positions as of 14 January 2004, in order to prevent banks from selling in the 
spot market. In turn, banks’ NDF oversold positions resulting from trading with non-residents had to be 
90% or more of their NDF oversold positions as of 16 January 2004, to prevent their selling due to 
NDF fixing. In short, the regulations were intended to prevent foreign exchange banks’ buying of NDF, 
thus limiting excessive selling off by non-residents. 
Even though these regulations on NDF transactions succeeded in preventing speculative NDF trading 
by non-residents and in stabilising the market, they also resulted in shrinkage of the NDF trading, in 
widening the gap between on-shore and off-shore swap rates, and in an increase in banks’ losses 
from NDF transactions with non-residents. For instance, the off-shore swap rates dropped sharply to 
0.34% on 12 February 2004 from 3.35% at the end of 2003, while the on-shore swap rates remained 
stable. The decline in the off-shore swap rate resulted in losses for foreign exchange banks from 
compulsory NDF trading with non-residents, while reducing the borrowing costs paid by non-residents. 204  BIS Papers No 24
 
NDF swap rate and interest differential 
 
Furthermore, the decline of the swap rates below the interest rate differentials (domestic minus 
international interest rates) brought about hasty and massive capital inflows to the domestic bond 
market, magnifying uncertainties concerning capital flows. In other words, foreigners invested in 
domestic bonds such as government bonds and monetary stabilisation bonds, after raising domestic 
funds by foreign exchange swaps. The amount of bond investment during the period from 16 January 
to 20 February was estimated at US$ 1.4 billion, surpassing the entire annual amount in 2003 of 
US$ 1.0 billion. 
 
Net investment flows into domestic bonds since NDF regulation 
(US$100 m) 
2001 2002 2003  04.1.1  -  1.15  1.16  - 2.20  2.21 - 2.28  Mar - Apr 
1.2 3.6 9.7 0.4 14.2 1.2  1.7 
Note:  Figures for 2004 are preliminary. 
 
For these reasons, the regulations were gradually loosened and then abolished in April 2004, since 
the Korean government judged that speculative trading by non-residents had abated. Specifically, the 
banks’ oversold position limit of 90% was reduced to 60% on 20 February and to 30% on 20 March. 
Finally, the swap rate recovered its ordinary level after the government abolished the oversold position 
limit on 20 April 2004.  
3.  Implications for future exchange rate operations 
Since adoption of the free floating exchange rate system, the Korean authorities have actively 
endeavoured to achieve stabilisation of the foreign exchange market. In the process of overcoming the 
currency crisis, the Korean authorities tried to expand the nation’s international reserves. Recently, 
they intervened in the foreign exchange market to smooth the pace of exchange rate changes 
resulting from over-supply of foreign exchange due to the current account surplus, from the whimsical 





















































NDF Swap rate-interest rate
differential (right hand scale)
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NDF Swap Rate(left hand 
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Considering Korea’s thin foreign exchange market as a small open economy, and the vulnerability of 
the won exchange rate to diverse external shocks and the changing global environment, the Korean 
authorities’ efforts to stabilise the exchange rate could be regarded as inevitable. From a future policy 
perspective, however, it is more desirable to let the exchange rate be determined in the market, 
reflecting the economic fundamentals and foreign exchange flows. This seems to be a prerequisite for 
building up a mechanism for the self-regulation of exchange rate fluctuations and developing the 
foreign exchange market by encouraging autonomous foreign exchange trading.  
In the case of a radical and unexpected change in the exchange rate, or of an existence of one-sided 
exchange rate expectations due to transient external shocks, the authorities will inevitably implement 
smoothing operations. Furthermore, to achieve the goals of exchange rate operations, it also seems to 
be indispensable for any speculative attacks to be swiftly dealt with as they increase the possibility of 
foreign exchange market turmoil. Furthermore, enhancement of the authorities’ credibility and 
transparency in exchange rate operations is also an essential objective. 206  BIS Papers No 24
 
Annex 1: 
The effect of US dollar and Japanese yen on Korean won 
The results of an empirical test using daily data indicate that before the adoption of the free floating 
exchange rate system (March 1990 - October 1997) the effect of the US dollar on the won showed 
plus sign and was statistically significant. Since adoption of the free floating system (April 1998 - 
March 2002), however, the impact of the Japanese yen on the won has become more crucial than that 
of the US dollar. 
 
- Equation: log(Won/CHF)t = α0 + α1 log(US$/CHF)t + α2 log(Yen/CHF)t+ε 
- Frequency: daily data 
 
 
Sample period  α0  α1  α2 R  bar
2 F-value 





(–6.87)***  0.752 142.3 





(7.32)***  0.793 82.8 
Notes:  1)  Figures  in  parentheses  indicate  t  values.   2)    ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.   3)  Won: Korean won, CHF: Swiss franc, Yen: Japanese yen. 
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Annex 2: 
The effect of off-shore NDF transactions  
on the won/dollar exchange rate 
Using GARCH (Generalised ARCH) models, the effect of off-shore NDF transactions on the won/dollar 
exchange rate is tested. The empirical results show that the won/dollar exchange rate shows positive 
signs (indicating a weakening of the won) in reaction to depreciations of the yen and to non-residents’ 
buying of won/dollar NDFs, while showing negative signs in reaction to foreign investment in domestic 
stocks, as expected. In addition, an increase in NDF transactions enlarges exchange rate volatility, as 
the coefficient α3 shows statistically significant positive signs. This implies that the won/dollar 
exchange rate has been greatly influenced recently by external factors such as the movement of the 
yen against the US dollar and off-shore NDF transactions by non-residents. 
 
- Equation:  st = β0 + β1 st-1 + β2 yent + β3 ksit + β4 ndft + εt 
εt ~ (0, σ
2) 
σ
2 = α0 + α1 εt-1
2 + α2 σt-1
2 + α3 cndfc

- Sample period: 1 Jan 2000 - 22 Oct 2002 
- Frequency: daily data 
 
 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
β0  1.89 (0.89)  –49.50 (–3.22)*** –83.05  (–4.78)*** 
β1  0.99 (587.8)***  0.99 (248.9)***  0.97 (176.9)*** 
β2    13.81 (3.35)***  30.04 (5.34)*** 
β3     –3.73  (–3.99)*** 
β4  0.012 (13.57)***  0.012 (13.19)***  0.012 (12.83)*** 
α0  –0.81 (–2.52)**  –0.73 (–2.17)** –0.69  (–2.06)** 
α1  0.24 (5.87)***  0.29 (5.60)*** 0.27  (5.58)*** 
α2  0.69 (18.13)***  0.63 (13.37)*** 0.64  (13.74)*** 
α3  0.021 (7.49)***  0.024 (6.81)***  0.024 (7.21)*** 
Adjusted R
2 0.996  0.996  0.996 
DW 1.93  1.90  1.93 
Notes:  1)  Figures  in  parentheses  indicate  t  value.   2)    ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.      3)    s: closing rate of won/dollar exchange rate in log transformation; yen: yen/dollar exchange rate in log 
transformation; ksi: KOSPI (Korean Stock Price Index) in log transformation; ndf: non-residents’ net buying of NDFs; 
cndfc: absolute value of non-residents’ NDF transactions. 
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